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U.S. Chamber of Commerce Liability
Survey: Inaccurate, Unfair, and Bad
for Business jels_1155 969..1002
Theodore Eisenberg*
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce uses its Survey of State Liability to criticize judiciaries and
seek legal change but no detailed evaluation of the survey’s quality exists. This article
presents evidence that the survey is substantively inaccurate and methodologically flawed. It
incorrectly characterizes state law; respondents provide less than 10 percent correct answers
for objectively verifiable responses. It is internally inconsistent; a state threatened with
judicial hellhole status ranked first in the survey while venues not on the list ranked lower.
The absence of correlation between survey rankings and observable activity suggests that
other factors drive the rankings. Two factors may help explain them. First, persistent low
ranking of Gulf Coast states indicates that corporate counsel cannot shed hostility to states
that were prominent in asbestos and tobacco litigation, notwithstanding changes in state
laws. Second, low rankings of populous states suggest respondents fail to distinguish between
rates of events and the absolute number of events. Adverse events in large states may occur
more often but not necessarily at higher rates than in small states. The Chamber’s uses of the
survey fail to account for the sample design, fail to account for the same respondent rating
multiple states, fail to account for industry effects, and fail to distinguish among respondents
based on their knowledge of a state. The survey may discourage investment in the United
States. and corporate risk managers’ views suggest that the survey promotes corporate
behavior that needlessly endangers the public.
I. Introduction
Evaluating court performance is of perennial interest but methodologically challenging.
As Choi, Gulati, and Posner note: “Everyone recognizes that there are better and
worse courts and better and worse judges, but how does one evaluate courts and
*Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Statistical Sciences, Myron Taylor Hall, Cornell
University, Ithaca, NY 14853; email: ted-eisenberg@lawschool.cornell.edu.
My interest in evaluating the survey analyzed here arose after meeting with Louisiana’s Ad Hoc Committee to
Study Perceptions of the Legal System (the Committee), a 21-member group chaired by Louisiana Chief Justice
Catherine D. Kimball. The Committee asked me to assess the Chamber’s survey; in particular, the Committee
wished to know whether the survey identified problems that Louisiana’s legal system should address. The views
expressed here are solely my own, I thank Kevin Clermont and Marhn Wells for comments. I have served as a legal
consultant for plaintiffs’ counsel in tobacco, asbestos, and pharmaceutical litigation.
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judges?”1 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce (the Chamber) Survey of State Liability2 (the
survey), an annual survey that began in 2002, receives substantial attention. State govern-
ments use it to attract business,3 to criticize judiciaries and seek pro-business legal change,
and to justify judicial salary increases.4 The Chamber and other business groups use the
survey in court to support legal arguments to narrow actions against businesses.5 Delaware’s
Superior Court, presumably proud of Delaware’s perennial number one survey rank,
supplies links to the Chamber’s surveys.6 But the Chamber’s conclusions about West
Virginia, a state it regularly criticizes, have been questioned7 and the Chamber’s results are
inconsistent with more objective methodology.8 To date, however, no detailed evaluation of
the survey’s quality or consistency with state law has been published. This article seeks to
supply that evaluation.
Analysis suggests that the survey is methodologically flawed and provides little useful
information for states assessing their liability systems or for businesses considering invest-
ment in states or in the United States. The survey lacks elementary social scientific objec-
tivity and incorrectly characterizes state law. Objectively verifiable responses are correct less
than 10 percent of the time. Respondents ignore legal rules and material events within
states. States that allow punitive damages can be ranked higher with respect to punitive
damages than a state that does not allow them at all. A state can be on a “judicial hellhole”
watchlist but rank first in the Chamber’s system while other venues not on the list rank
lower.
Technical methodological flaws also abound. The Chamber’s uses of the survey often
fail to account for the survey sample design, fail to account for respondents rating multiple
1Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluations and Information Forcing: Ranking State High
Courts and Their Judges, 58 Duke L.J. 1313, 1314 (2009).
2For the 2008 survey results, see Inst. for Legal Reform [hereinafter “ILR”], Lawsuit Climate 2008, http://
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/index.php?option=com_ilr_harris_poll&year=200, accessed 6/23/2009. Refer-
ences to the Chamber’s annual survey are hereinafter of the form “[year] Survey.”
3Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1316, 1327.
4Id. at 1327. The American Legislative Exchange Council relies on the Chamber’s rankings in evaluating states. The
American Legislative Exchange Council, Arthur B. Laffer, Stephen Moore & Jonathan Williams, Rich States, Poor
States: ALEC-Laffer State Economic Competitiveness Index 143 (2d ed. 2009).
5E.g., Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 2004 WL 2125702, Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d
684 (Mich. 2005); Amicus Curiae Brief of Wisc. Mfrs. & Commerce, 2002 WL 32699975; Wischer v. Mitsubishi Heavy
Indus. Am, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. App. 2002).
6Dela. St. Cts., News Arch., http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/Superior%20Court/?news_prev.htm, accessed 6/23/
2009 (though some links are broken).
7Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1345–47 (tbl. 8 showing West Virginia ranked more highly); Elizabeth G. Thornburg,
Judicial Hellholes, Lawsuit Climates and Bad Social Science: Lessons from West Virginia, 110 W. Va. L. Rev. 1097
(2008).
8Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1354.
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states, fail to account for industry effects, and fail to report results separately for those with
the self-reported greater knowledge of a state’s legal system. Normally such a flawed study
would not be worth evaluating. But the Chamber uses its large budget to promote the survey
and, as noted above, the survey receives substantial attention.
The most damaging effects of the Chamber’s survey likely are not on the states the
Chamber attacks but on our whole country’s fiscal and physical well-being. U.S. businesses
invest largely based on criteria more relevant to their decisions than the Chamber’s claims
about state legal systems.9 But the Chamber’s use of its survey to attack courts and juries
creates false impressions about states and the United States that may discourage foreign
investment. Since companies cannot control the states in which they may be sued and
foreign companies are more likely to lack the “on-the-ground” accurate information that
domestic companies have, they may unnecessarily fear doing business, or increasing invest-
ment, in the entire country. Evidence from large corporations’ risk managers and neutral
third parties, in contrast to the survey, suggests that the survey may encourage corporate
actions that unnecessarily endanger the public.
This article describes the Chamber’s methodology in Section II and describes the
survey’s fundamental bias in Section III, a bias exacerbated by a likely excess response rate
from corporate counsel whose companies have lost cases. Section IV addresses demon-
strable errors in the Chamber’s treatment of state law, with treatment of punitive damages
and class actions being especially problematical. Section V suggests that the respondents’
hostility to Gulf Coast and large states stems from flawed information processing. Section VI
identifies statistical methodological flaws in the survey. Section VII concludes.
II. The Chamber’s Methodology
The Chamber’s methodology varies over time but the basic approach has not changed.
Rather than paraphrase and risk misdescription, I present the methodology largely by
quoting with minor editing from the Chamber’s most recent report of it. Sections II.A and
II.B thus rely on the Chamber’s description of the 2008 survey methodology.
9E.g., Public Citizen, New U.S. Chamber of Commerce Poll Ranking States’ Liability Systems Is Part of a Disinforma-
tion Campaign to Restrict Consumer Rights (Mar. 8, 2005):
It becomes still clearer just how meaningless the Chamber’s state ranking is when one compares it with other
state business rankings. Some states that chronically languish at the bottom of the Chamber poll are cited by
other sources as great places to do business. These include Texas, Illinois, Alabama, South Carolina and
Florida—all named among the most desirable business climates in Site Selection magazine’s 2004 ranking,
which surveys corporate executives. Illinois, which placed 46th in the Chamber’s 2005 ranking of state liability
systems, was rated the third best business location in the country in the 2004 Site Selection survey. Alabama,
South Carolina and Florida, all in the bottom 25 percent in the Chamber poll, made the 2005 Poll in a
Corporate Top 10 Pro-Business States list.
See also http://www.justice.org/PressRoom/PressReleases/truth_about_chamber.pdf, at 4, accessed 6/25/2009
(survey of National Association of Manufacturers ranked lawsuit abuse as a minor concern); note 129, infra (drug
company relocated from highly ranked Virginia to lower ranked New Jersey notwithstanding Chamber’s claim to have
detected a hostile legal environment in New Jersey for drug companies).
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A. Sample Design
A representative sample of companies with annual revenues of at least $100 million annu-
ally was drawn using idExec,10 Dun & Bradstreet, Access Markets International (AMI)
Partners, Inc., and Aggressive List Management. An alert letter was sent to the general
counsel at each company.11 This letter provided general information about the study,
notified them that an interviewer from Harris Interactive would be contacting them, and
requested their participation. It also included a fact sheet about the study, the 2007 press
release, and an article about the 2007 results that was published by Bloomberg LLP. In
addition to receiving an alert letter, some contacts were told that a $50 or $100 donation
would be made to a charity in exchange for agreement to participate in the study. This
initiative was implemented toward the end of the interview period in order to increase
cooperation and assure an adequate sample.
The sample was segmented into two main groups. Of the 957 respondents, 57 were
from insurance companies, with the remaining 900 interviews being conducted among
public and private corporations from other industries. The proportion of interviews with
insurance companies represents 6 percent of the total sample, which is the typical repre-
sentation of insurance companies in the universe of companies with $100 million or more
in revenues. Since property casualty insurance companies have extensive experience with
state liability systems, for the purposes of this study the Chamber worked to ensure that the
proportion of insurance companies matched the overall population.12
B. Telephone Interviewing Procedures
The study utilized Harris Interactive’s computer-assisted telephone interviewing system,
whereby trained interviewers call and immediately input responses into the computer. This
system reduces clerical error by eliminating the need for keypunching, since interviewers
enter respondent answers directly into a computer terminal during the interview itself. This
data entry program does not permit interviewers to inadvertently skip questions, since each
question must be answered before the computer moves on to the next question. The data
entry program also ensures that all skip patterns are correctly followed. The on-line data
editing system refuses to accept punches that are out of range, it demands confirmation of
responses that exceed expected ranges, and asks for explanations for inconsistencies
between certain key responses.
To achieve high respondent participation, in addition to the alert letters, numerous
telephone callbacks were made in order to reach the respondent and conduct the interview
at a convenient time for the respondent.
10idExec, http://www.idexec.com/, accessed 7/1/2009.
11If the general counsel at a company could not be identified, the alert letter was sent to another senior person at the
company such as the chief executive officer or senior vice president.
12The 2008 Survey also reports that: “Respondents had an average of 19.3 years of relevant legal experience (including
their current position), had been with their company an average of 11.6 years, and had been in their current position
an average of 9.1 years.” 2008 Survey at 28.
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Once a qualified respondent was identified, the respondent was first asked about
his/her familiarity with several states. First, 24 states out of the list of 50 possible states
were presented to the respondent. Within these 24 states, the 17 states presented were:
Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Washington, and
Wyoming. These states were prioritized to get a sufficient number of evaluations, since in
past study years, data for these states were based on fewer evaluations. The remaining
seven states were randomly selected from the remaining states not mentioned above.
Respondents were then given the opportunity to name any other state, aside from the
states already presented, and specify if they were very or somewhat familiar with that
state.
Respondents who were very or somewhat familiar with a state were given the oppor-
tunity to evaluate that state’s liability system. Similar to 2007, the maximum number of
states a respondent could evaluate was 10. On average, each respondent evaluated
four states, up from an average of three states in 2007. In previous years (2002–2006),
respondents were given an opportunity to evaluate a maximum of 15 states, evaluating
an average of six states. This was changed in 2007 to reduce the burden on respon-
dents and increase the likelihood that they were familiar with the states they were
rating.
C. The Elements in the Survey
The initial 2002 survey asked about 10 elements, with an overall state grade computed
from them. The survey graded the elements on an “A” through “F” scale. In initially
translating to numerical values, the Chamber assigned 4 to an A, 3 to a B, 2 to a C, 1 to
a D, and 0 to an F. In 2006, the Chamber changed the number associated with each
grade, raising the highest number to 5 for an A and the lowest number to 1 for an F.13
To illustrate the responses for one state, Table 1 lists Delaware’s results for the elements
in 2002 and 2008 (the earliest and most recent results available as of this writing), the
mean score for each element, and Delaware’s state rank for each element. In 2006
the Chamber added an element about having and enforcing venue rules, and changed
the class action element to include “mass consolidation suits” in addition to class action
litigation.14
On the original scale, Delaware’s overall state score, shown in the table’s last row, was
3.2 in 2002; on the new scale Delaware’s overall score in 2008 was 3.9. Due to the change
in the numbers assigned to grades, the numerical difference means little and Delaware
overall ranked first in both years. The reliability of the survey’s relative rankings of states is
discussed below.
132006 Survey at 7.
14Id. at 6.
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III. The Chamber’s Methodology Assures a
Biased Survey
The Chamber’s survey violates the elementary principle that evaluation of legal system
performance should be based on input from both sides to disputes. Even if the Chamber
limited its focus to corporate respondents, more balanced views were available from within
corporations and those who study them. The bias introduced by the Chamber’s decision to
limit its sample to a narrow group of corporate lawyers is exacerbated by its decision to
inform potential respondents of prior survey results.
A. The Chamber’s Biased Sample
Observers objectively evaluating the fairness of legal systems act based on the obvious
insight that asking only one side to a dispute about a system will yield biased results. It would
not even occur to the 21 states that formally evaluate judges15 to seek input from only one
side to a dispute. Credible evaluations ask for the opinions of both sides to disputes. For
15Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System, Shared Expectations: Judicial Accountability in
Context 8 (2006). Recommended best practices would also ask for evaluations from at least litigants and jurors as well
as lawyers. Id. at 69.
Table 1: Delaware Ratings on Key Elements of State Liability Systems
n for 2002 = 75; n for 2008 = 95
Element
Mean Grade
Interstate Ranking
for the Element
2002 2008 2002 2008
Having and enforcing meaningful venue
requirements (added in 2006)
na 4.1 na 1
Overall treatment of tort and contract
litigation
3.1 4.0 1 1
Treatment of class action suits (mass
consolidation suits added in 2006)
3.4 4.0 1 1
Punitive damages 3.1 3.8 1 1
Timeliness of summary judgment/dismissal 3.0 3.8 1 1
Discovery 3.2 3.9 1 1
Scientific and technical evidence 3.1 3.9 1 2
Noneconomic damages (added in 2006) na 3.8 na 3
Judges’ impartiality 3.4 4.2 1 1
Judges’ competence 3.5 4.3 1 1
Juries’ predictability 2.7 3.5 1 13
Juries’ fairness 2.9 3.7 1 10
Overall state grade 3.2 3.9 1 1
Note: “na” indicates that states were not ranked on the element in 2002. Different scales were used to assign
numerical scores to letter grades in 2002 and 2008.
Sources: Chamber Surveys 2002, 2008.
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example, the Alaska Judicial Council is directed by law to evaluate the performance of
judges to appear on retention election ballots. When the Council asks counsel about a
judge’s fairness it asks all of the attorneys in a case.16 Nevada recently reviewed all states’
judicial evaluation procedures and designed a pilot study for the state’s use. In surveying
attorneys in the pilot project, Nevada used all attorneys listed in a case, not just those
representing one side.17 When Delaware, the Chamber’s favorite state, sought information
about its own courts’ fairness to respond to the Chamber’s suggestion that Delaware was on
the verge of becoming an infamous judicial hellhole, Delaware asked lawyers on both sides
of the issue.18 By asking only corporate counsel, the Chamber’s study is a caricature of what
a serious evaluation of a liability system should look like.
The bias in the Chamber’s sample likely exceeds the obvious bias of asking only one
side and precludes the survey even from accurately assessing that one side’s view of court
performance. The vast majority of civil lawsuits settle or are dismissed before trial.19 A
corporate decision to press to trial a potentially large case likely involves senior corporate
counsel. When senior counsel approves a refusal to settle, he or she is going out on a
limb. A loss at trial can be a personal professional setback. Being human, counsel pro-
bably is unconvinced by the adverse decision about what should have been the case’s
proper outcome. It is only natural to blame bias by the courts or juries in the forum of the
loss.
After the loss, along comes the Chamber’s annual survey, which, as indicated by
Section II.A above, has had such a problem obtaining sufficient responses that the Chamber
now pays respondents to reply. Is the hypothetical losing counsel more or less likely than
the average survey target to respond to the survey? The professional setback is likely one of
the most salient things about the legal system to this person, and the survey offers an
opportunity to disapprove of the locale that caused the professional embarrassment. The
embarrassment is exacerbated if the company not only lost at trial but suffered an award of
punitive damages. Now counsel really looks bad. And company funds may be at risk because
not all punitive damages awards can be covered by insurance.20
16Alaska Judicial Council, http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/retention/retent.htm, accessed 6/21/2009.
17Rebecca M. Thomas, James T. Richardson & Matthew Leone, Nevada Judicial Evaluation Pilot Project, Final Report
19 (Grant Sawyer Center for Justice Studies 4/28/2009).
18Richard D. Kirk, Bartholomew J. Dalton, Edward M. McNally, Allen M. Terrell, Jr. & Jeffrey M. Weiner, Special
Committee on Superior Court Toxic Tort Litigation: Report and Recommendations (May 9, 2008), http://
courts.delaware.gov/Courts/Superior%20Court/pdf/?asbestos_toxic_tort_report.pdf, accessed 6/23/2009.
19E.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care? 6 J. Empirical
Legal Stud. 111 (2009).
20E.g., American Int’l. Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Res-Care Inc., 529 F.3d 649, 663 (5th Cir. 2008) (applying Texas law);
Fairfield Ins. Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, LP, 246 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. 2008). In the abstract, if litigation losses were
unidormly distributed across states, a “losing counsel” response bias might apply across all states with no net effect on
states’ rankings. But majoy litigation losses (or wins for that matter) likely are not so distributed, as suggested by large
movements in some states’ year-to-year rankings. See Section V.A.
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The methodological point is not whether corporate counsel or the venue of the loss
was correct. The point is that this counsel is more likely than the average corporate counsel
to respond to the survey. So the Chamber not only limits survey responses to corporate
counsel, thereby assuring only one side of issues is represented, it likely gets a disproportion-
ate response rate from counsel who have overseen recently lost cases. A well-designed survey
should seek to account for likely biases.21 The Chamber’s does not.
B. The Chamber Could Achieve Better Balance from Corporate Respondents
Even if the Chamber wished to limit respondents to those within the business community,
greater balance and a more reliable ranking of states could be achieved. One step would be
to ask respondents within the company who are less likely to have been professionally
embarrassed by an important litigation recommendation. Within large corporations, evalu-
ation of the civil justice system varies by position within the company. Studies over time and
across industries suggest that the Chamber’s survey’s claims of perceived excess corporate
liability are not representative of corporate views.
The Weber Report, commissioned by the business group the Conference Board, was
a survey of “the risk managers of 232 major U.S. corporations. . . . each having a minimum
annual sales revenue of $100 million.”22 It concluded that product liability concerns,
even in 1986 at the height of concerns about insurance coverage and costs, had been
exaggerated.
For the major corporations surveyed, the pressures of product liability have hardly affected larger
economic issues, such as revenues, market share, or employee retention. Liability lawsuits, which
are indeed numerous, are overwhelmingly settled out of court, and usually for sums that are
considered modest by corporate standards. . . . Where product liability has had a notable
impact—where it has most significantly affected management decision making—has been in
the quality of the products themselves. Managers say products have become safer, manufac-
turing procedures have been improved, and labels and use instructions have become more
explicit.23
The Weber Report’s risk manager findings were largely replicated in a later study.
Professor Gary Schwartz of UCLA Law School interviewed risk managers for California
public agencies and the UCLA Medical Center. He asked whether potential liability caused
their safety efforts, or whether efforts to improve safety were simply a desire to do the right
thing. He found that all risk managers “emphasized that their efforts were due to the
combination of both. A risk manager starts with the idea that accident avoidance is a good
for its own sake. But the prospect of tort liability provides an important reinforcement as
21E.g., Steven Garber, Michael D. Greenberg, Hilary Rhodes, Xiaohui Zhuo & John L. Adams, Do Non-Economic
Damages Caps and Attorney Fee Limits Reduce Access to Justice for Victims of Medical Negligence?, 6 J. Empirical
Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2009).
22Nathan Weber, Product Liability: The Corporate Response (Conf. Bd. Report No. 893, 1987)
23Id. at 2.
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well as an essential way to sell the risk manager’s proposals to others in the organization.”24
Evidence from industry-specific studies is consistent with the risk managers’ views.25
In conclusions relevant to the Chamber’s interests, the Weber Report suggests that
the Chamber’s survey results would be quite different if the survey were more balanced.
“The findings of the present survey also refute the general contention of a severe and
deepening crisis in tort liability and insurance availability, at least for the nation’s large
corporations. The impact on the general economy, likewise, is believed to have been
minor.”26
C. Providing Respondents with Prior Years’ Results
One aspect of the Chamber’s methodology increases the likelihood that the bias in a prior
year’s survey will continue in subsequent years. The Chamber states that it provided the
2008 respondents with “a fact sheet about the study, the 2007 press release and an article
about the 2007 results that was published by Bloomberg LLP.” So before a respondent is
called, he or she knows the prior year’s results. The Chamber’s decision in the 2008 survey
to pay respondents suggests that the number of responses for many states in earlier years
was a concern. Providing respondents with an earlier year’s results is itself troubling and
providing earlier results that were based on too few responses is even more problematical.
This may help explain why respondents continue to show little or no reaction to material
changes in legal environments.27
IV. Assessing the Survey’s Accuracy
Biased samples promote invalid results but assessing accuracy can be challenging. For most
survey elements it is not feasible to objectively assess the survey’s accuracy. Responses to
elements, listed in Table 1, relating to judge and jury fairness, treatment of scientific
evidence, discovery, and timeliness of dismissals are not readily amenable to verification
since they call for subjective opinions. One cannot objectively determine if respondents
graded correctly for most elements since usually no grade is objectively correct or incorrect.
24Gary Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter? 42 UCLA L. Rev. 377,
415–16 (1994). Schwartz reported that one risk manager started his job with considerable skepticism over whether the
tort system effectively deterred, but his job experiences led him to believe that “tort liability exerts a significant
influence.” Id. at 416.
25John D. Graham, Product Liability and Motor Vehicle Safety, in Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan, eds., The
Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability Law on Safety and Innovation 119, 181 (Brookings Inst. 1991) (evaluating
motor vehicle industry); Nicholas A. Ashford & Robert F. Stone, Liability, Innovation, and Safety in the Chemical
Industry, in Huber & Litan, supra, at 368 (evaluating chemical industry); Rollin B. Johnson, The Impact of Liability
on Innovation in the Chemical Industry, in Huber & Litan, supra, at 450, 452 (evaluating chemical industry); Judith
P. Swazey, Prescription Drug Safety and Product Liability, in Huber & Litan, supra, at 291 (pharmaceutical industry).
26Weber, supra note 22, at 2.
27Text accompanying notes 91–95, infra.
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Liability Survey 977
The survey’s treatment of two questions, however, can be partially assessed by com-
paring them to state law. The survey’s treatment of punitive damages and class actions
reveals inaccurate legal knowledge combined with questionable methodology. Punitive
damages are of special interest because they play a prominent role in the Chamber’s results.
The survey’s accuracy is also testable by respondents’ reaction to Delaware’s receptivity to
asbestos cases leading to Delaware being placed on a judicial hellhole watchlist.
This section first describes the central role of punitive damages in the survey and then
documents problems with the survey’s treatment of punitive damages, class actions, and
judicial hellhole designation.
A. The Importance of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages play a, if not the, most visible role in the Chamber’s rankings. Statements
about what issues are important as well as statistical analysis of what influences the state
rankings both establish punitive damages’ importance.
In 2002, the Chamber presented the information in Table 2, Panel A, as identifying
issues of prime concern.28 Punitive damages were the specific issue of greatest concern, just
after the nonspecific issue of general tort reform. The gap between punitive damages and the
issue of next greatest concern, judicial competence, was wide. Punitive damages continued
to play a prominent role in the 2003 through 2007 surveys, and remained prominent in the
2008 survey. Table 2, Panel B, based on a table in the Chamber’s 2008 survey,29 shows that
punitive damages again ranked second in importance.
282002 Survey at 15.
292008 Survey at 8.
Table 2: Most Important Issues for State Policymakers
Who Care About Economic
Development to Focus on to Improve Litigation
Environment
A. 2002 Survey
Tort reform issue 18%
Punitive damages 17%
Judicial competence 6%
Selection of judges 6%
[Other issues with lower percentages] not shown
B. 2008 Survey
Speeding up the trial process 12%
Reform of punitive damages 10%
Eliminate unnecessary lawsuits 9%
Tort reform issues in general 8%
[Other issues with lower percentages] not shown
Sources: Chamber 2002, 2008 Surveys, Table 4.
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Another perspective on the data confirms the importance of punitive damages to
survey respondents. The Chamber’s survey give states an overall grade and rank by com-
bining states’ grades across surveyed elements. When rankings are based on aggregation
across several factors, the most variable factors most influence the rankings. For example,
suppose students take courses from five teachers, and an overall grade point average is
computed from the courses (the factors). Students are then ranked based on the grade
point averages. Assume that four of the teachers give all the students a grade of B. The fifth
teacher varies the grades, with a range from A to F. The fifth teacher will completely
determine a student’s rank because that teacher provides all the variability in grades. The
component of an aggregate ranking that varies the most will have a potent influence on the
overall ranking.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of survey responses for each element of the Cham-
ber’s 2002 survey. The box plots in the figure display the grade distribution for each survey
element. The figure indicates the elements along its left vertical axis. The left and right
borders of the boxes for each element correspond to the 25th and 75th percentile grades
cumulated for all states. For example, the 25th percentile for the element “Juries’ fairness”
was 2.0 (corresponding to a grade of C). The lines within the boxes indicate the 50th
Figure 1: Distributions of Chamber’s survey elements, 2002.
WV DEMS
WV AL DEAL
DESM
MS
MS WV LA
MS AL
MS
MS
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
Grade distribution
Discovery
Class actions
Judges' competence
Juries' predictability
Summary judgment/dismissal
Scientific/technical evid.
Juries' fairness
Judges' impartiality
Punitive damages
Note: Box plot of individual survey elements. For each element ranked in the 2002 Survey, the figure shows the 25th
and 75th percentiles, the median, the upper and lower adjacent values, and the data points more extreme than the
adjacent values. The separation between the 25th and 75th percentiles and for the lower and upper adjacent values
is greatest for punitive damages. State postal abbreviations show outliers.
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percentile (or median). For example, the median numerical grade for “Judges’ compe-
tence” was 2.5.
The ends of the “whiskers” extending to the left and right of the boxes indicate what
are referred to as the upper and lower adjacent values. They are based on the interquartile
range, which is the 75th quartile grade minus the 25th quartile grade. The adjacent values
are the most extreme values within 1.5 times the interquartile range of the nearer quartile.
The points beyond the ends of the whiskers, which are labeled in the figure using states’
postal abbreviations, are outliers in that they are more extreme than the adjacent values.
The figure shows that the separation between the 25th and 75th percentiles (the
width of the boxes) and the spread in responses represented by the whiskers was greatest for
punitive damages. This indicates that states’ rankings for punitive damages likely contrib-
uted more than other graded elements to the overall grade and ranking. The importance
of punitive damages persists over time. In the 2008 survey, only juries’ fairness competed
with punitive damages for the largest spread.30 Figure 1 also shows that only five states
appear as outliers for any element in 2002: Alabama, Delaware, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
West Virginia. In 2008, the same five states were the sole outliers, except that Massachusetts
was an additional positive outlier with respect to scientific and technical evidence. This
consistency of extreme responses for a few states is discussed in Section V below.
B. Erroneous Treatment of Punitive Damages and Class Actions
Given the importance of punitive damages, the Chamber’s survey should be especially
careful to evaluate the topic. Yet the Chamber’s treatment of the topic ranges from merely
negligent to possibly overtly biased.
The merely negligent treatment of punitive damages is due to the Chamber’s and/or
its respondents’ inaccurate knowledge of states’ punitive damages laws. The Chamber has
treated New Hampshire as having punitive damages when a substantial consensus exists that
the state generally does not have them. For all years prior to 2008, the Chamber treated
New Jersey as not having punitive damages when it does. The Chamber continues to treat
Massachusetts as not having punitive damages when it does have them.
1. New Hampshire Punitive Damages Law
In its 2002 survey, the Chamber ranked New Hampshire 14th among states with respect to
punitive damages.31 New Hampshire’s black-letter law with respect to punitive damages is
simple: “This jurisdiction forbids the award of punitive damages.”32 In 2002, the Chamber’s
first survey year, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reiterated that “New Hampshire
30In the 2002 survey, both had interquartile ranges of 0.4 and standard deviations of 0.33.
312002 Survey at 21.
32Panas v. Harakis, 529 A.2d 976, 986 (N.H. 1987), quoting Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1872). “However, when
the act involved is wanton, malicious, or oppressive, the compensatory damages awarded may reflect the aggravating
circumstances.” Panas v. Harakis, 529 A.2d at 986, quoting, Vratsenes v. N.H. Auto, Inc., 289 A.2d 66, 68 (1972).
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does not permit recovery of punitive damages in personal injury cases.”33 In the context of
a driving-while-intoxicated case, a New Hampshire Superior Court judge has recognized
that New Hampshire is “out of step with the majority of states” in not allowing punitive
damages.34 Where a trial court reduced a jury award on the ground that it determined part
of the award to be punitive in nature, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire approved a
remittitur.35 The American Tort Reform Association acknowledges that New Hampshire
effectively does not allow punitive damages.36 The Chamber itself effectively conceded its
mistreatment of the issue because after 2003 the survey does not treat New Hampshire as
having punitive damages.37 The Chamber does not expressly acknowledge its erroneous
treatment of New Hampshire with respect to punitive damages.
2. New Jersey Punitive Damages Law
The Chamber’s 2002 through 2007 surveys state that New Jersey does not award punitive
damages in general. But New Jersey does authorize punitive damages.38 Empirical data show
that punitive damages are not rare events in New Jersey when requested and plaintiffs win at
trial.39 The Chamber effectively admitted this error, not by expressly acknowledging the
mistreatment of the state, but by finally changing New Jersey’s treatment in the 2008 survey.
The treatment of punitive damages in New Jersey reinforces the evidence from the
punitive damages treatment in New Hampshire. From 2002 through 2007, over 800 survey
respondents reported themselves to be somewhat or very familiar with New Jersey law. Yet
apparently not a single respondent knew enough or cared enough to inform the Chamber
that it was erroneously describing New Jersey law.
3. Massachusetts Punitive Damages Law
The Chamber’s 2002 through 2008 surveys state that Massachusetts does not allow punitive
damages in general. The surveys oversimplify Massachusetts law. In cases of wrongful death
33In re Wintle, 781 A.2d 995, 997 (N.H. 2001), citing Aubert v. Aubert, 529 A.2d 909 (1987). In an action based on
federal law, an insurer can be liable for punitive damages. American Home Assurance Co. v. Fish, 451 A.2d 358, 360
(N.H. 1982).
34Hanscom v. O’Connell, 2003 WL 23305265, at *4 (N.H. Super. 11/7/2003).
35DeBenedotto v. CLD Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., 903 A.2d 969, 985 (N.H. 2006).
36American Tort Reform Association, Punitive Damages Reform, http://www.atra.org/show/7343, accessed 6/20/
2009. Some New Hampshire statutes authorize punitive damages but that has not altered the consensus view of New
Hampshire being a state without punitive damages. Illustrative statutes are N.H. Rev. Stat. § 147-A:12 (wrongful
discharge of whistleblowers who report hazardous waste violations); N.H. Rev. Stat. § 167:61 (punitive damages for
false welfare claims of up to three times the excess benefit).
37E.g., ILR, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/states/pdf/NewHampshire.pdf, accessed 6/21/2009 (stating
“New Hampshire does not allow punitive damages in general.”).
38N.J. Stats Ann. 2A:15–5.12(a).
39Theodore Eisenberg, Michael Heise, Nicole L. Waters & Martin T. Wells, The Decision to Award Punitive Damages:
An Empirical Study (draft) (data only available for a subset of counties).
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Liability Survey 981
or discrimination, Massachusetts law authorizes punitive damages.40 Both these areas are
presumably of prime interest to the Chamber’s members. In practice, punitive damages
have been awarded in Massachusetts cases, though seemingly not at as high rates as in other
states.41
Incorrectly characterizing punitive damages law is understandable and may be inno-
cent legal analytic negligence. But the Chamber’s failures to expressly acknowledge its
errors, or even to award a grade to states that do not have punitive damages, is at best
incompetent methodology and at worst intentional distortion. As shown above, punitive
damages arguably have been the issue of most concern to survey respondents. States that do
not allow punitive damages self-evidently should receive high grades from respondents on
the punitive damages question.
C. Assessing the Survey’s Results When Objective Benchmarks are Available
Punitive damages also provide an opportunity to objectively assess the relation between
respondents’ answers and the state of the law. Two other developments permit similar
assessment. The Chamber warned a state of its appearance on a judicial hellhole watchlist,
thus seemingly establishing that the state should decline in the rankings. The survey’s
treatment of class actions allows comparison of the state of the law with survey responses.
1. Punitive Damages
The Chamber’s 2002–2003 erroneous treatment of New Hampshire with respect to punitive
damages opens a rare window into the Chamber’s respondents’ actual knowledge of the
states they rank. Since the Chamber treated New Hampshire as having punitive damages in
2002 and 2003, it published the responses for those years. New Hampshire’s grades for
punitive damages for these years are capable of objective evaluation and respondents
almost always graded incorrectly.
According to the Chamber, New Hampshire’s “Mean Grade” for punitive damages in
2002 was 2.4.42 That is the same grade that New Hampshire received for “Overall Treatment
of Tort and Contract Litigation.” It is a notch below New Hampshire’s “Overall State Grade”
of 2.5. The Chamber’s respondents thus gave New Hampshire a lower grade on punitive
damages than the state’s overall grade despite New Hampshire’s prohibition of punitive
damages. Fourteen percent of the 2002 New Hampshire respondents gave the state a D or
F with respect to punitive damages, a remarkable performance for a group that is supposed
to be informed about the state. Only seven of 63 respondents gave New Hampshire an A
with respect to punitive damages. In 2003, New Hampshire’s 2.5 mean grade on punitive
damages was again below the state’s overall treatment, which received a grade of 2.6. And
40Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 229 § 2 (wrongful death); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 151B § 9 (punitive damages); Gasior v.
Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 846 N.E.2d 1133, 1140 (Mass. 2006).
41Eisenberg et al., supra note 39.
422002 Survey at 58.
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only one respondent in 39 gave New Hampshire the presumably proper grade of A. For the
two years combined, the Chamber’s respondents gave New Hampshire the correct A grade
in only eight out of 102 responses. Less than 10 percent of the respondents had sufficient
knowledge of New Hampshire law to get a central feature of its law right.
The Chamber admits that the proper punitive damages grade for New Hampshire
and other nonpunitive damages states should be the highest ranking. In its 2007 survey, the
Chamber recognized this by assigning states without punitive damages “the highest score
achieved from other states on punitive damages (i.e., Delaware’s).”43 This is in a sense too
low a ranking because the nonpunitive damages states deserve a higher ranking than
Delaware, which clearly allows punitive damages.44 The Chamber claims that the alternative
measure has not affected the rankings. But this claim is not credible for all years. For
example, giving Louisiana an A for punitive damages in the 2002 survey would have moved
it up in the rankings, as would an A in the 2003 survey.
Delaware’s and New Jersey’s treatment with respect to punitive damages is additional
evidence that respondents lack elementary knowledge of states they rank. Table 1 shows
Delaware ranked first for punitive damages in 2002 and 2008, ahead of all states that do not
have punitive damages (Louisiana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Washington). Delaware
courts have approved punitive damages awards of at least $10 million45 and a punitive-
compensatory ratio of almost ten to one,46 well above a national aggregate ratio.47 New
Jersey courts not infrequently award punitive damages, yet, as noted above, over 800 survey
respondents failed to correct the Chamber’s mistreatment. As in the case of New Hamp-
shire, the Chamber’s respondents appear to have almost no knowledge of states they
ranked. The New Jersey results support the New Hampshire based finding that less than 10
percent of respondents have acceptable knowledge of the state legal systems they evaluate.
2. Judicial Hellholes
A second instance of objectively verifiable information comes from an incident in the
Chamber’s most highly ranked state, Delaware. In 2006, the Delaware Superior Court
rendered an asbestos litigation decision that the Chamber found unacceptable. In 2005
many out-of-state asbestos cases were filed in the court and the corporate defendants
argued against hearing the cases and moved to dismiss them.48 On March 8, 2006, the court
432007 Survey at 18.
44E.g., Galindez v. Narragansett Housing Assocs., L.P., 2006 WL 3457628 (Del. Super. 11/28/2006) (approving $10
million punitive award).
45Galindez v. Narragansett Housing Assocs., L.P., supra.
46Jones v. Delaware Comty. Corp. for Individual Dignity, 2004 WL 2827924 (Del. Super. 4/29/2004).
47Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2624 (2008) (median ratio is about 1:1).
48Kirk et al., supra note 18.
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refused to dismiss them.49 On November 1, 2007, the President of the Delaware Chamber
of Commerce wrote to the Presiding Judge of the Delaware Superior Court expressing
concern about Delaware’s receptivity to many toxic-tort personal injury cases. The letter
suggested that Delaware was in danger of descending into judicial hellhole status. The
threat embodied in the letter was described as follows by the Special Committee Delaware
appointed to investigate the concerns:
In its letter, the Chamber noted Delaware’s appearance in reports of the American Tort Reform
Foundation (ATRF) on a “Watch List” for potential “Judicial Hellholes.” ATRF publishes an
annual list of what it considers “Judicial Hellholes,” which it says “are places where judges
systematically apply laws and court procedures in an unfair and unbalanced manner, generally
against defendants in civil lawsuits.” For the past two years, ATRF has placed Delaware on its
“Watch List,” which ATRF reserves for “jurisdictions [showing] suspicious or negative develop-
ments in the litigation environment or histories of abuse.”50
So in 2007, Delaware was on a list of potential judicial hellholes.51 In 2007, Madison County,
Illinois was on the same list as Delaware52 but that county was singled out by the Chamber’s
respondents as having one of the least fair litigation environments in the country.53
A state added to the list should suffer in its Chamber ranking since many states are
not on that list. One therefore would have expected Delaware’s overall rank and rank in
survey elements to decline during this time period. Yet in 2005, 2006, and 2007 Delaware
ranked first in “Overall Treatment of Tort and Contract Litigation.”54 Delaware’s rank for
another element related to accepting non-Delaware asbestos actions55 should also have
been affected. Beginning in the 2006 survey, the Chamber asked respondents to rank states
for “Having and Enforcing Meaningful Venue Requirements.” A state on a judicial hellhole
watchlist for accepting tort suits unrelated to the state should rank low for this element. Yet
49Id. at i.
50Id. at 1 n.1. Despite the Delaware Committee’s finding that the asbestos ruling was fair, the Chamber’s tactics may
have their intended effect. Delaware judges now know that if they rule in a way the Chamber does not like their ruling
may be the subject of a special committee investigation.
51American Tort Reform Foundation (ATRF), Judicial Hellholes 2007, at iv.
52Ann Knef, Madison County Ascends from ATRA’s “Hellhole,” The Madison-St. Clair Record, 12/18/2007. Madison
County was removed from a list of most unfair jurisdictions not by virtue of a systematic assessment of the outcome
of cases, but because Madison County jurors reportedly delivered five defense verdicts in a week. Knef, supra.
Chamber members did not get the message as they ranked Madison County as the fifth most unfair and unreasonable
local jurisdiction in 2008. 2008 Survey at 9. For evidence about the actual pattern of case outcomes in Madison
County, see Neil Vidmar et al., “Judicial Hellholes”: Medical Malpractice Claims, Verdicts and the “Doctor Exodus” in
Illinois, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1309 (2006).
532007 Survey at 8; 2008 Survey at 9.
542005 Survey at 21; 2006 Survey at 26; 2007 Survey at 14.
55The Chamber’s letter to Delaware’s Superior Court expressed concern about filings “by out-of-state law firms on
behalf of out-of-state plaintiffs whose claims have no meaningful connection to Delaware.” Kirk et al., supra note 18,
at 1.
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in 2006 Delaware ranked second.56 In 2007, the year Delaware was informed of its pending
judicial hellhole status, Delaware ranked third.57 Respondents apparently had little knowl-
edge of activity in Delaware but nevertheless graded the state.
3. Class Actions
Another objectively verifiable grade is Mississippi’s for class actions. From 2002 through
2005, the Chamber graded states on class actions. It did not report the respondents’
answers for Mississippi on the ground that Mississippi did not have class actions.58 From
2006 through 2008, the Chamber asked a combined question about class actions and
aggregate litigation. Mississippi ranked in the bottom four states on this element in all three
years even though Mississippi does not have class actions.59
At best, the Chamber created an untenable category on which to grade Mississippi. If
the state was not gradable on class actions through 2005, it did not become gradable in the
combined class actions/aggregate litigation element in 2006 through 2008 since it was not
gradable on one part of the combined element. Mississippi could only receive an A on class
actions since it does not allow them. But the Chamber did not allow respondents’ to give a
presumed grade of A for Mississippi in class actions, and whatever grade respondents
wished on a non-class-action litigation element. The Chamber’s combined element pro-
vided respondents’ grades only in years in which Mississippi’s class actions grade was
undisclosed and uncounted because the grade was embedded in the aggregate element.
New Jersey’s large decline in rank in 2008 provides an opportunity to assess respon-
dents’ knowledge of case law relating to class actions. In 2007, New Jersey ranked 14th in
class actions.60 In 2008, it ranked 35th,61 a 21-place decline and among the largest declines
of any state in any year. What happened to class action doctrine in New Jersey to cause the
decline? Without access to the data or to the respondents one cannot know for sure. But
one can evaluate whether New Jersey reasonably should have been expected to substantially
decline from its 2007 rank by reviewing available New Jersey class action decisions for the
period relevant to the Chamber’s 2008 Survey interviews.
The Chamber’s 2008 Survey was based on interviews between December 18, 2007 and
March 19, 200862 and the 2007 Survey was based on interviews between December 27, 2006
562006 Survey at 25.
572007 Survey at 15.
58E.g., 2005 Survey at 56.
592006 Survey at 27; 2007 Survey at 16; 2008 Survey at 17.
602007 Survey at 16.
612008 Survey at 17.
62Id. at 27.
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and March 2, 2007.63 So the most relevant cases for assessing New Jersey’s drop from 2007
to 2008 were decided after March 2, 2007 and before March 19, 2008. Table 3 lists the
relevant class action cases I was able to locate using online searches. While this may not be
a complete list of class action decisions in New Jersey, it is a reasonable sample of cases in
which New Jersey courts articulated class action doctrine through written opinions. The
results of the doctrine-shaping class action cases suggest, if anything, a case law pattern
632007 Survey at 26.
Table 3: New Jersey Class Action Opinions During Period of Chamber’s 2008 Survey
Date Case Name, Citation Ruling
Ruling Limits
Class Actions
1/15/08 Santomenno v. Allmerica Fin.
Corp., 2008 WL 123920
Affirmed summary judgment
dismissal of purported class
action.
yes
9/6/07 Int’l Union of Operating
Eng’rs v. Merck & Co., 929
A.2d 1076 (N.J.)
Reversed certification of
nationwide class of
third-party payors in Vioxx
action.
yes
8/10/07 Buynie v. Airco, Inc., 2007 WL
2275013
Affirmed order denying class
certification of medical
monitoring claim.
yes
7/31/07 In re Vioxx Litig., 928 A.2d
935
Affirmed dismissal of 98 U.K.
Vioxx claims on grounds of
forum non conveniens.
yes
6/22/07 Beegal v. Park W. Gallery, 925
A.2d 684
Reversed certification of
nationwide class action
against cruise ship
company.
yes
5/31/07 Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
922 A.2d 710 (N.J.)
Reversed denial of class
certification of claim that
employees were required to
work off the clock.
no
5/22/07 Hannan v. Weichert S. Jersey,
Inc., 2007 WL 1468643
Affirmed denial of class
certification.
yes
3/30/07 Chandelaria v. Rent-A-Center,
2007 WL 935584
Affirmed denial of leave to
amend complaint to assert a
class action.
yes
3/10/07 Chadwick 99 Assocs. v.
Director, Div. of Taxation,
23 N.J. Tax 390
Refused to certify class action
in tax matter.
yes
3/7/07 Muise v. GPU, Inc., 917 A.2d
261
Reversed decertification of
class to allow utility
customers time to present
proof of damages.
no
Note: Decisions were in N.J. Superior Court unless citation indicates otherwise.
Source: Online searches for New Jersey class action decisions from March 2, 2007 and before March 19, 2008.
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moving against certification of class actions or aggregate litigation in New Jersey. Of the 10
decisions in the table, eight favored the Chamber’s anti-class action/aggregate litigation
views and two did not.
Aside from a 4:1 ratio favoring the Chamber’s views, two of the decisions are notewor-
thy because of their special visibility and New Jersey’s important role in Vioxx litigation.64 In
one case in Table 3, New Jersey’s Supreme Court reversed certification of a nationwide class
of third-party payors against Merck & Co., Inc. based on death and injuries resulting from
Vioxx. In another case, a New Jersey appellate court affirmed dismissal of 98 U.K. Vioxx
claims on grounds of forum non conveniens. Both of these decisions would be expected to
find favor with the Chamber’s respondents in the survey element “Treatment of Class Actions
Suits and Mass Consolidation Suits.” Yet, as noted, New Jersey dramatically declined in this
category.65
The two decisions should have improved New Jersey’s rank for another element.
Class actions or aggregate litigation can bring nonresidents’ cases into a state. As described
above, Delaware risked judicial hellhole status by allowing nonresident asbestos cases in its
courts. Since the two Vioxx decisions rejected New Jersey as a forum for out-of-state and
out-of-country events, these two rulings might be expected to produce an improved rank for
New Jersey for the survey element “Having and Enforcing Meaningful Venue Require-
ments.” But New Jersey also plummeted in that category to 39th from its 26th place ranking
in 2007.
V. What Explains the Rankings?
Respondents’ rankings are not driven by objectively ascertainable statutory or case law.
Respondents graded correctly less than 10 percent of the time for grades verifiable by
statutory law. And respondents apparently did not rank New Jersey based on what
occurred in class action decisions. Nor are the rankings explicable by the Chamber’s sense
of where courts may be failing. Delaware’s consistently high rank is inconsistent with its
judicial hellhole watchlist status.66 If respondents do not rank on ascertainable law, they
are responding to other stimuli and this section explores that possibility.
This section first shows the relation across elements of the grades given by Chamber
respondents. The relation is strikingly consistent, suggesting that only a single impression
64See text accompanying notes 110–118, infra.
65On January 16, 2007, in Sinclair v. Merck & Co., 913 A.2d 832 (N.J. Super. 2007), a New Jersey Superior Court
reversed dismissal of a medical monitoring class action against Merck but offered no opinion concerning the ultimate
viability of the class action. On review on June 4, 2008, the Supreme Court of New Jersey dismissed the medical
monitoring suit filed by Vioxx plaintiffs. 948 A.2d 587 (N.J. 2008).
66Counsel for large corporations may systematically overrank Delaware. Large corporations tend to incorporate in
Delaware and counsel for these corporations, the Chamber’s primary respondents, presumably approve of Delaware’s
laws regulating corporate governance. E.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An
Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 Cardozo
L. Rev. 1475, 1476 (2009).
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about a state drives a state’s grades for all elements. The section then suggests that a state’s
grades are driven largely by (1) respondents’ negative historical reaction to a few states,
including all Gulf Coast states, that played prominent roles in the history of modern tort
litigation, and respondents’ inability to change views in light of changed events, and (2)
respondents’ failure to distinguish between absolute levels of activity and rates of activity,
resulting in unwarranted low rankings of populous states. Respondents’ failure to recognize
that more events they dislike are likely to occur in more populous states may explain New
Jersey’s otherwise puzzling decline in rank.
A. Evidence that a Single Latent Factor Determines Rankings
To explore the interelement pattern of the Chamber’s respondents’ rankings, it is helpful
to visualize the relation among the graded elements. Figure 2 is a matrix of scatterplots of
the association between each of the graded elements in 2008. For example, the first graph
in the upper left of the figure shows the scatterplot for the relation between a state’s overall
tort and contract litigation grade and its grade for class actions. Each point in the scatter-
plot represents a state’s score on these two elements.
The figure shows high correlations among the graded elements. For the 66 bivariate
relations between two Chamber elements represented in Figure 2, correlation coefficients
(which can range from -1.0 to +1.0) between elements are never less than 0.68, only one is
less than 0.75, and most are in the neighborhood of 0.8, 0.9, and greater. All of the linear
correlations are statistically significant at p < 0.0001. The Chamber has acknowledged that
its ranking elements are highly correlated.67
The correlation pattern suggests using the statistical method known as factor analysis
to assess how many latent independent factors the Chamber’s multiple elements repre-
sent.68 Confirmatory factor analysis supports what the figure suggests—although the
Chamber ranks on many elements, only a single latent factor is at work for a state.69
The high interelement correlations suggest not only that one factor is at work but also
further calls into question the respondents’ knowledge of individual survey elements. It is
implausible that states line up so uniformly across all queried elements. Table 1 shows
extreme uniformity, with the 2002 survey ranking Delaware first in all categories. The state’s
high rank survived its later placement on the hellhole watchlist since Delaware has ranked
first overall in every year of the survey. Figure 1 shows that only Delaware achieved positive
outlier status with respect to any element. Delaware ranking first with respect to punitive
damages, ahead of all states that have no punitive damages, further suggests that respon-
dents respond to individual survey elements based on a single latent factor about a state
672008 Survey at 3 n.2; 2007 Survey at 2 n.2 (“All of the key element items were highly correlated with one another and
with overall performance.”); 2006 Survey at 7.
68Factor analysis assesses variability among a group of observed variables in terms of fewer unobserved variables called
factors. Richard L. Gorsuch, Factor Analysis (2d ed. 1983).
69See, e.g., Ke-Hai Yuan & Peter M. Bentler, Mean and Covariance Structure Analysis: Theoretical and Practical
Improvements, 92 J. Am. Statistical Assoc. 767 (1997).
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rather than based on knowledge of elements for each state. No valid ranking could have
Delaware first with respect to punitive damages. And large companies tend to choose New
York, not Delaware, as a forum and as a choice of law in their contracts.70 Yet in 2008 New
York ranked 25th overall compared to Delaware’s first.
The single latent factor likely exists for low-ranked states as well as for high-ranked
Delaware. When respondents disapprove of a state, the state tends to rank low in all
categories. For example, in the 2008 survey, neither Mississippi nor Louisiana is ranked
higher than 47th in any category. Figure 1 shows that in the 2002 survey only the same four
states achieved negative outlier status with respect to any element. The within-state variation
across element grades is also strikingly small. In the 2008 survey, no state’s grade on any
element differed from its grade on any other element by even as much as one grade level.
For example, if the state had a mean grade of 3.5 on one element it never got more than
a 4.3 or less than a 2.7 on any other element.
When a state swings wildly in the Chamber’s ranking from year to year, it tends to do
so across many elements, again suggesting a single factor drives grades. Tennessee’s overall
ranking moved from 29th in 2006, up to 7th in 2007, and then down to 22nd in 2008.71
These large swings are implausible and become less so upon inspecting individual ele-
ments. In 2007, Tennessee was ranked in the top five states for the following elements:
“Having and Enforcing Meaningful Venue Requirements” (4th); “Treatment of Class
Action Suits and Mass Consolidation Suits” (2nd); “Punitive Damages” (3rd); “Non-
economic Damages” (5th); and “Juries Predictability” (4th).72 In 2008, Tennessee’s rank-
ings for these elements were, respectively: 29th, 27th, 15th, 27th, and 33rd.73 Substantial
movement within some elements is utterly implausible. Vermont’s judges, for example,
ranked 29th for impartiality and 26th for competence in 2007.74 In 2008, they ranked 7th
and 10th, respectively.75 Colorado’s judges moved from the 9th most competent to the 25th
most competent in a single year.76 Judiciaries tend to not turn over quickly enough and
judges’ behavior across entire states does not swing wildly enough to support such short-
term massive changes. Vast movement across many elements in a single year and across
particular elements suggests that respondents lack knowledge of individual elements and
rank on a single impression of a state.
Despite the lack of within-state variation in a year, the question remains: What might
drive a state’s ranking? The most plausible measure may be that the respondents provide a
70Eisenberg & P. Miller, supra note 66.
712008 Survey at 7.
722007 Survey at 11–13.
732008 Survey at 16–18, 22, 25.
742007 Survey at 22–23.
752008 Survey at 23–24.
762006 Survey at 34; 2007 Survey at 23.
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measure of large corporations’ overall faith in a state court system. If that is the factor
represented, one should expect an association between the Chamber’s ranking and the rate
at which corporations opt out ex ante from the court systems when they have an opportu-
nity to do so. Since large corporations may opt out of court systems through ex ante
agreements to arbitrate, there should be an association between a state’s ranking and the
rate at which arbitration clauses are used in contracts of large corporations connected to
the state. Yet that association has not been detected to exist; the relation between ranking
and arbitration clause use appears to be random.77 The respondents’ rankings are thus
inconsistent with their own corporations’ behavior.
Some insight into the source of the Chamber’s respondents’ grade pattern emerges
from the data map in Figure 3, which shows in its lightest shade the states the Chamber
ranks lowest. At least three observations are worth noting based on the figure. First, low
rankings are only partially tied to states associated with one political party or another. Both
liberal and conservative states incur respondents’ displeasure. But the Chamber’s strongest
approval, signified by those states with the darkest shading, is largely reserved for more
conservative states, except for the low population states of Vermont and Maine. Second,
every one of the five Gulf Coast states fares poorly in the Chamber’s study. In 2008, for
example, the mean overall tort and contract ranking for Gulf Coast states was 2.92 com-
pared to 3.47 for other states, a statistically significant difference (p = 0.002; Mann-Whitney
test). Third, no state with a relatively large population obtains high ratings from the
Chamber. Virginia, the 11th largest state by population, is the most populous state receiving
strong Chamber approval.
77Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration
Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 335, 370–71 (2007).
Figure 3: State overall tort and contract grade, 2008.
Range of survey grade
(3.65,4]
(3.5,3.65]
(3.3,3.5]
[2.5,3.3]
Note: The map shows shading corresponding to the 2008 survey grade for each state for the element “Overall
Treatment of Tort and Contract Litigation.” Alaska and Hawaii are not shown. Source: 2008 Survey.
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The political pattern seems readily explicable but the Gulf Coast and population
effects less so. While any explanation without additional information about respondents
and about actual case outcomes in states is somewhat speculative, the latter two effects may
be tied to heuristics that preclude the Chamber’s biased sample of corporate respondents
from accurately processing information.
B. The Gulf Coast-Tobacco Effect
Gulf Coast states have played a prominent role in the modern history of big-stakes tort
litigation. In the 1980s and somewhat earlier, a fairly small number of large asbestos
disputes resulted in large awards.78 Due to the location of shipyards and other industries,
workers poisoned by asbestos tended to be concentrated in Gulf Coast states. “In the early
days of the litigation, cases were filed in about a dozen federal and state courts in coastal
areas where shipyard workers had been heavily exposed to asbestos and in the gulf states
where there had been heavy use of asbestos in petrochemical facilities.”79 From 1993 to
2003, states with large-scale asbestos trial consolidations included Louisiana, Mississippi,
and Texas.80 Florida has also been important in asbestos litigation.81
Several lawyers prominent in asbestos litigation then played a role in the largest
settlement in litigation history, $246 billion, embodied in the state attorneys general’s
tobacco cases’ Master Settlement Agreement in 1998.82 That litigation started in Mississippi
and other Gulf Coast states—Florida, Texas, and Louisiana—played early and prominent
roles. Another state that fares poorly in the Chamber’s ranking, West Virginia, was one of
the first five states to bring an action against the tobacco companies83 and has played a
prominent role in asbestos litigation.84 South Carolina, another low-ranked state, had
attorneys who played a prominent role in tobacco and asbestos litigation,85 including
Ronald Motley, portrayed by actor Bruce McGill in the tobacco litigation movie, The
78William Haltom & Michael McCann, Distorting the Law: Politics, Media, and the Litigation Crisis 167–68 (2004).
79Stephen J. Carroll, Deborah Hensler, Allan Abrahamse, Jennifer Gross, Michelle White, Scott Ashwood & Elizabeth
Sloss, Asbestos Litigation Costs and Compensation: An Interim Report 34 (RAND 2002). See also Stephen J. Carroll,
Deborah Hensler, Jennifer Gross, Elizabeth M. Sloss, Matthia Schonlau, Allan Abrahamse & J. Scott Ashwood,
Asbestos Litigation 61 (RAND 2005) [hereinafter “RAND 2005”].
80RAND 2005, supra note 79, at 38–42
81Id. at 61. None of the 11 states that RAND describes as quantitatively prominent in asbestos litigation, id. at 62, is
ranked highly in the Chamber survey.
82Master Settlement Agreement, available at the National Association of Attorneys General website, http://
www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msa-pdf/1109185724_1032468605_cigmsa.pdf, accessed 6/26/2009.
83Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine
of Parens Patriae, 74 Tulane L. Rev. 1859, 1861, 1875–76 n.95 (2000).
84RAND 2005, supra note 79, at 29, 32, 34, 40–41.
85Id. at 32 n.31.
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Insider.86 The prominence of Gulf Coast attorneys in tobacco litigation enhanced the capital
available to fund litigation by an increasingly visible group of plaintiffs’ lawyers.87
So large corporations’ counsel had been beaten badly by Gulf States’ plaintiffs’
lawyers, increasingly encountered well-funded adversaries in those states, and may have
become disgruntled with those states. But their dissatisfaction does not necessarily equate
with unfair treatment. Few people seriously defend the asbestos or tobacco industries’
behavior88 (though that of course does not mean that they should lose every lawsuit, and
they do not89). Nevertheless, when people have strong prior attitudes on a subject, they have
difficulty in updating those attitudes in light of objective or new evidence.90 The Chamber’s
responding lawyers, many of whom may have responded to the survey in more than one
year, probably had corporate careers shaped by, or conducted in the shadow of, asbestos
and tobacco litigation. Their or their mentors’ hostility to Gulf Coast states, West Virginia,
and South Carolina might be what the Chamber’s surveys reflect rather than objective
evaluation of elements within states.
Some states continuously ranked low have changed circumstances that are evidence
against the Chamber’s survey providing an objective evaluation. These states have dramati-
cally changed their laws but the respondents’ prior impressions are difficult to modify with
new evidence. So when Texas enacted a slew of tort reforms91 and provided an opinion
highly favorable to corporate defendants,92 the Chamber’s respondents may simply have
been incapable of modifying their views based on new developments. That Louisiana
enacted pro-business statutes93 and prohibits punitive damages similarly had little effect on
86Internet Movie Database, The Insider, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0140352/, accessed 6/26/2009.
87Michael Freedman, Tobacco Lawyers, http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2001/0514/134.html, accessed 6/26/2009.
88See, e.g., Paul Brodeur, Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos Industry on Trial (1985); Stanton A. Glantz, John
Slade, Lisa A. Bero, Peter Hanauer & Deborah E. Barnes, The Cigarette Papers (1996). But the wrongdoing is not all
on one side. The misbehavior of some plaintiffs’ counsel and experts in asbestos and silica litigation, see In re Silica
Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Tex. 2005), may reinforce survey respondents’ negative views of states
prominently associated with asbestos cases.
89For information about tobacco trial win rates after the Master Settlement Agreement, see Theodore Eisenberg,
Damage Awards in Perspective: Behind the Headline-Grabbing Awards in Exxon Valdez and Engle, 36 Wake Forest L.
Rev. 1129 (2001).
90Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior
Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 2098 (1979); Peter C. Wason, On
the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task, 12 Q. J. Experimental Psychol. 129 (1960).
91American Tort Reform Association, http://www.atra.org/wrap/files.cgi/7964_howworks.html, accessed 6/25/
2009.
92Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997) (limits on acceptable epidemiological evidence in
pharmaceutical cases).
93NAMIC Report Details State Tort Reform Efforts, Insurance J., 1/9/2004, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/
national/2004/01/09/35533.htm, accessed 6/25/2009 (Louisiana, Texas, and Florida among the states that have
passed the most tort reform statutes); http://www.namic.org/reports/tortreform/, accessed 6/25/2009.
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their views. Mississippi’s pro-business statutes have had little effect on its rankings.94 West
Virginia’s legislature enacted caps on medical malpractice damages, limits on joint and
several liability, restrictions on lawsuits by out-of-state plaintiffs, and elimination of third-
party bad faith claims against insurance companies.95 Yet that state also continues to fare
poorly in the Chamber’s rankings. Under this view, the respondents are at least partly living
in the past.
One caveat to the asbestos-tobacco explanation of rank is necessary. Alabama is a
low-ranked Gulf Coast state whose rank is not readily explicable by asbestos and tobacco
developments. RAND’s study of asbestos litigation does not list Alabama as ever having
relatively large numbers of asbestos cases or as being the site of a major consolidated
asbestos trial.96 And, unlike other Gulf Coast states, Alabama decided not to be a major
player in the state attorneys general tobacco litigation.97 Alabama’s low Chamber rank
seems more attributable to (1) the importance of punitive damages in the Chamber’s
survey, as shown in Section IV.A, (2) substantial punitive damages activity in Alabama,
and (3) as in the case of other Gulf Coast states, respondents’ inability to alter their views
based on changed circumstances in a state.
Alabama has been repeatedly singled out for its treatment of punitive damages.98 Its
reputation as being hostile to defendants in the 1990s was “based in substantial part on an
increasing number of large punitive damage awards in Alabama courtrooms,”99 and the use
of punitive damages in alleged fraud cases involving insurance companies.100 George
Priest’s 1996 study of three small Alabama counties, conducted in connection with litiga-
tion, reported punitive damages claims in over 70 percent of tort claims in the early
1990s.101 In 1987, Alabama’s legislature enacted several tort reform measures; among those
94R. Neal, Tort “Reform” Around the South, 3/30/2006, The Institute for Southern Studies, http://
www.southernstudies.org/2006/03/tort-reform-around-south.html, accessed 6/25/2009.
95Thornburg, supra note 7, at 1098–99.
96RAND 2005, supra note 79, at 38–41 (list of consolidated trials), 63 (list of courts with at least 2 percent of state court
asbestos filings in any period).
97William H. Pryor Jr., William P. Gray Jr., John Wible, Peggy Schmitz & Michael DeBow, Report of the Task Force on
Tobacco Litigation Submitted to Governor James and Attorney General Sessions, October 2, 1996, 27 Cumberland
L. Rev. 577 (1996–1997).
98E.g., Nathan C. Prater, Comment, Punitive Damages in Alabama: A Proposal for Reform, 26 Cumberland L. Rev.
1005 (1995–1996).
99Michael C. DeBow, The Road Back from “Tort Hell”: The Alabama Supreme Court, 1994–2004, at 3 (The Federalist
Soc’y for Law & Pub. Policy Studies, Oct. 15, 2004), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/
20070325_alabama2004.pdf, accessed 7/5/2009).
100Id.
101George L. Priest, Punitive Damages Reform: The Case of Alabama, 56 Louisiana L. Rev. 825, 827–28 (1996). The
data were reported to have been collected “for the case Gallant v. Prudential.” Id. at 828 n.16. The study did not report
the rate at which plaintiffs were granted punitive damages.
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struck down as violating the state constitutional right to jury trial was a $250,000 cap on
punitive damages.102 In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed
an Alabama Supreme Court decision and held that a 500-to-1 ratio of punitive to compen-
satory damages violated federal due process rights.103
Whatever the past reality of punitive damages in Alabama, the state has substantially
changed. By 2004, a critic of Alabama punitive damages law noted that: “It would be difficult
to find a state supreme court that has changed more in the last decade than the Alabama
Supreme Court.”104 After reviewing several cases, he concluded: “Pretty clearly, Alabama
punitive damages practice has changed a great deal since the days of BMW v. Gore.”105 In
2007, it was noted that Alabama had not been included on the American Tort Reform
Foundation’s list of judicial hellholes for four years.106
How did the Chamber’s respondents reflect the pro-business changes in Alabama
punitive damages law? They penalized Alabama in the rankings. In 2002, respondents ranked
Alabama third from last with respect to punitive damages; in 2008, despite substantial
change, respondents ranked Alabama second from last.107 Consistently with the respondents’
failure to adjust to legal changes in Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and West Virginia, the
Alabama respondents seem unaware of changes in punitive damages or unable to update
their views. Respondents’ inflexibility is consistent with evidence from other states that
respondents know little about the states they rank.
C. Respondents’ Denominator Problem: Biasing Results Against Large States
Some states ranked low by the Chamber are not Gulf Coast states and were not early
supporters of tobacco litigation. These tend to be large states such as California, Illinois, and
Pennsylvania. The respondents’ hostility to large states may be an instance of what can be
called the “denominator problem.” People have trouble making rational decisions when the
decisions require properly accounting for the denominator in assessing the likelihood of
events. They tend to focus on the number of events rather than on the rate of events.
The results of one leading experiment along these lines read in part as follows:
When offered an opportunity to win $1 on every “win” trial in which they drew a red jelly bean,
subjects frequently elected to draw from a bowl that contained a greater absolute number, but a
smaller proportion, of red beans (e.g., 7 in 100) than from a bowl with fewer red beans but better
102Henderson v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878 (Ala. 1993).
103BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
104DeBow, supra note 99, at 1.
105Id. at 5 (footnote omitted).
106R. Harrison Smith, Commentary, A Key Time for Qui Tam: The False Claims Act and Alabama, 58 Ala. L. Rev. 1199,
1212 (2007).
1072002 Survey at 21; 2008 Survey at 18.
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odds (e.g., 1 in 10). Subjects reported that although they knew the probabilities were against
them, they felt they had a better chance when there were more red beans.108
The larger number of red beans, more events, distracted subjects from the true rates.
This information processing problem may explain why the Chamber’s respondents
disfavor legal environments in populous states. Populous, low-ranked states’ legal systems
may act against the Chamber’s members’ interest at a lower rate than more highly ranked
states. But the Chambers’ respondents’ difficulty in accounting for the larger number of
cases in large states may prevent the respondents from ranking rationally.
Figure 4 shows the relation between the 2008 Chamber grade for overall contract and
tort litigation and state population. The figure shows a negative correlation, with a correla-
tion coefficient of-0.28 and a significance level of 0.049. If one excludes four obvious outliers
in the figure (Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and West Virginia), the correlation coefficient
is a reasonably strong (-0.42) and the significance level is 0.004. The figure’s straight line is
108Veronika Denes-Raj & Seymour Epstein, Conflict Between Intuitive and Rational Processing: When People Behave
Against Their Better Judgment, 66 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol: 819 (1994).
Figure 4: Chamber grade and state population, 2008.
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the linear regression line, which clearly slopes downward. The outliers are either Gulf Coast
states, prominent tobacco/asbestos litigation states, or both. So adverse outcomes may affect
Chamber members in populous states, leading to low rankings. But more outcomes of all
kinds occur in populous states and the respondents may not account for this in evaluating
states.109
D. A Single Factor State-Specific Explanation
Further analysis of New Jersey suggests that a state’s grade can plummet for all elements based
on one or two events, and events of all kinds are more likely to occur in populous states
because any particular legal event tends to be more likely to occur in a populous state. New
Jersey’s questionable class action decline analyzed in Section IV likely related more to
non-class-action events than to class action developments. The Chamber’s comment on New
Jersey’s combined-grade decline to 35th place in 2008, from 26th place in 2007, is revealing.
Chamber CEO Tom Donohue attributed the decline to “the plaintiff-friendly bias in a
handful of trial courts, particularly in lawsuits aimed at pharmaceutical manufacturers.”110
New Jersey’s 2008 decline in rank likely stemmed largely from a 2007 multi-million dollar
verdict, which included punitive damages, in the New Jersey state court Vioxx trial in the case
of Humeston v. Merck & Co., Inc.111 New Jersey’s Atlantic County’s initial appearance on a
judicial hellhole list has been largely attributed to Vioxx litigation.112
Did Merck’s trial loss support Mr. Donohue’s claim of “plaintiff-friendly bias”? In
addition to other evidence,113 Merck-funded researchers reportedly withheld reports of
Vioxx-user heart attacks from an article submitted to the New England Journal of Medicine
(NEJM). NEJM editors published an “Expression of Concern” about the researchers’
109Comparing states across a demographic element such as population usually cannot be conclusive evidence that the
demographic element causes the measure being compared. This is because demographic elements such as popula-
tion, race, income, and urban concentration tend to be correlated.
110ILR, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/component/ilr_states/18/state/NJ.html, accessed 6/20/ 2009.
Merck lost a New Jersey state court trial relating to Vioxx in April 2006, before the 2008 Survey period. Wyeth lost a New
Jersey state court trial relating to Fen Phen in October 2008, after the 2008 Survey was completed. See Ed Silverman,
Wyeth Loses Diet Pill Lawsuit Over Lung Ailment, http://www.pharmalot.com/2008/10/wyeth-loses-diet-pill-lawsuit-
over-lung-ailment/, accessed 6/29/2009. In 1997, under pressure from the FDA, American Home Products Corp. (later
Wyeth) withdrew from the market its diet drugs Pondimin (fenfluramine) and Redux (dexfenfluramine). Fen Phen,
a combination of Pondimin and a mild stimulant called phentermine, was widely prescribed for weight loss. The
pressure to withdraw came after Mayo Clinic research showed 24 cases of rare heart valve disease in women who took
Fen Phen. See generally In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 553 F.
Supp. 2d 442, 449 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
111Frederick & Mary Humeston v. Merck & Co., No. ATL-L-2272-03, 3/12/2007. The jury verdict forms in Humeston
are available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/mass-tort/vioxx/index.htm, accessed 6/30/2009.
112ATRF, supra note 51, at 16–17.
113For a review of scientific evidence in Vioxx trials, see McDarby v. Merck & Co., 949 A.2d 223 (N.J. Super. 2008),
certification granted in part & denied in part, 960 A.2d 393 (2008).
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behavior.114 After Merck responded, the NEJM editors reaffirmed their concern and stated
that the article “did not contain relevant safety data available to the authors more than four
months before publication, did not accurately reflect the potential for serious cardiovas-
cular toxicity with rofecoxib [Vioxx].”115 So safety information about Vioxx was withheld, a
plaintiff who had suffered an adverse cardiovascular event sued and prevailed in a trial
conducted in New Jersey. Prior to 2007, New Jersey juries had ruled for Merck in a previous
Humeston trial, in Doherty v. Merck (2006)116 and against a plaintiff whose case was tried jointly
with Humeston’s.117 A jury split in the New Jersey Cona and McDarby Vioxx cases in 2006.118
The scientific evidence and pattern of verdicts does not establish bias and Mr. Donohue
provided no information supporting his claim.
Whether or not New Jersey’s overall rank should have declined based on the
Humeston case, New Jersey’s larger decline in class actions and other survey elements is
evidence that a single-factor can drive the Chamber’s respondents. The loss of a major drug
trial likely gave respondents a negative impression of events in New Jersey. This translated
into reduced grades for New Jersey in class action and venue elements, not based on what
happened with respect to these elements, but because a negative impression translated into
a lower grade for all elements.
In fact, New Jersey’s rank declined in every element from 2007 to 2008. Thus, in a
single year, according to respondents, New Jersey judges became less competent and
impartial, its discovery system deteriorated, its ability to process motions for dismissal and
summary judgment worsened, its juries became less fair and predictable, and its courts’
ability to evaluate scientific and technical evidence declined. The implausibility of New
Jersey’s results confirms Figure 2’s message that a single factor can drive a state’s ranking.
Respondents likely ranked New Jersey on all survey elements based on one factor, the
adverse outcome of publicized drug litigation.
The only element in which New Jersey did not decline in 2008 was punitive damages
and that too is revealing. No decline occurred because, as noted above, through 2007 the
Chamber incorrectly denied that New Jersey allowed punitive damages and failed to report
grades for that element. The Humeston punitive damages award apparently informed the
Chamber’s respondents of what was widely known—that New Jersey allows punitive
114Gregory D. Curfman, Stephen Morrissey & Jeffrey M Drazen, Expression of Concern: Bombardier et al., “Com-
parison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis,” New
Eng. J. Med. 2000;343:1520–8, 353 New Eng. J. Med. 2813 (Dec. 29, 2005).
115Gregory D. Curfman, Stephen Morrissey & Jeffrey M Drazen, Expression of Concern Reaffirmed, 354 New Eng. J.
Med. 1193 (Mar. 16, 2006).
116Elaine & Daniel Doherty v. Merck & Co., No. ATL-L-638-05-MT. The jury verdict form in Doherty is available at
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/mass-tort/vioxx/index.htm, accessed 6/30/2009.
117Estate of Brian Hermans v. Merck & Co., No. ATL-L-5520-05. The jury verdict form in Hermans is available at
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/mass-tort/vioxx/index.htm, accessed 6/30/2009.
118See McDarby v. Merck & Co., 949 A.2d 223 (N.J. Super. 2008), certification granted in part & denied in part, 960 A.2d
393 (2008).
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damages. Only in 2008, when punitive damages in the visible Humeston case made the
Chamber’s position untenable, did it report respondents’ New Jersey punitive damages
grades.
VI. Other Methodological Problems
The Chamber’s survey does not account for the sample design or for industry, a widely
recognized factor in studies of businesses. The failure to account for the sample design
manifests itself in at least three ways.
A. Failure to Account for Disproportionate Sampling
The Chamber acknowledged that its sampling technique could lead to oversampling of some
industries. The 2002 survey reported that insurance companies were substantially over-
sampled. Insurance companies were overrepresented by 73.3 percent in the 2002 sample,119
and the degree of under- or overrepresentation of other industries in 2002 and other years
is not known. It is standard statistical practice to account for survey over- or undersampling
through the use of probability weights. The use of such weights accounts for the fact that
oversampled subgroups are representing fewer unobserved members of a subgroup popu-
lation than are undersampled groups. The standard statistical adjustment is to weight
observations by the inverse of the probability of an observation being in the sample.120 The
Chamber acknowledged that it had oversampled but no indication exists that the Chamber
performed the necessary adjustment. When combining elements across states or making
comparisons over time, as the Chamber has done,121 or across states (the central purpose of
the survey) the Chamber’s methodology precludes obtaining reliable results.122
The incorrect results that failing to account for over- or undersampling can lead to can
be simply illustrated. Assume one wants to survey a random sample of citizens about approval
ratings for police but is concerned that a pure random sample would produce too few
members of a minority group. One therefore designs the sample to assure large enough
representation of that group. Suppose the minority group accounts for 10 percent of the
population and 50 percent of the sample. And suppose the minority group’s views differ from
the 90 percent majority so that 25 percent of the minority population approves of the police
1192002 Survey at 6.
120E.g., Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research 213–15 (11th ed. 2007).
121E.g., 2008 Survey at 7.
122In recent years, the Chamber appears to strive for proportionate representation of insurance companies in its
sample. 2008 Survey at 28. This suggests that the Chamber’s analysis may need to account for the stratification of the
sample into insurance company and other company components. No other industry receives the treatment of
insurance companies. Knowing the extent to which results depend on insurance company responses is especially
important for states, such as Louisiana, that allow direct actions against insurers. La. Rev. Stats. 22:655. Insurance
companies may have greater hostility toward and/or familiarity with direct action states.
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compared to 75 percent of the majority group. Simply averaging the responses to arrive at an
aggregate figure would yield a 50 percent approval rating. But that would be an incorrect
aggregate figure. Minority group members had a much larger probability of being in the
sample than did majority group members. They were nine times more likely to be sampled
than majority group members, and that oversampling must be accounted for. The correct
aggregate figure is 70 percent police approval, not 50 percent. This illustrates how badly off
the Chamber’s reports of some items may be, even as a representation of the views of an
already biased sample.
B. Failure to Account for Multiple Observations by a Subject
As described in Section II, the Chamber allows a respondent to evaluate 10 states in recent
years. The respondent need only report some familiarity with multiple states’ legal systems.
Observations by the same respondent obviously are not independent of one another.
Proper statistical practice requires accounting for this nonindependence in assessing sta-
tistical significance.123 The Chamber does not, and the methodological appendix the
Chamber supplies about statistical significance does not, address this issue.124 So a single
responding counsel may declare himself or herself familiar with 10 states, give them all low,
high, or varying rankings, and the consumer of the survey does not know whether that
single counsel influenced multiple states’ rankings. The consumer only knows that the
Chamber did not account for nonindependence.
The issue is of potentially substantial magnitude. For example, the 2008 survey
reports that 957 responses were received.125 That is about only 19 responses per state. Even
a nonpopulous state such as Alaska had 40 responses.126 So every state’s ranking depends
heavily on the same subjects ranking multiple states. Corporate counsel for a New Jersey
drug company unhappy with a loss at trial can rank New Jersey low and rank nine other
states high. The Chamber’s analysis does not account for this nonindependence.
C. Failure to Account for Varying Familiarity with a State
As described in Section II, the Chamber allows responses from subjects who self-report that
they are “very or somewhat familiar with that state.” The less-than-10 percent accuracy of
123E.g., Charles R. Shipan, Partisanship, Ideology, and Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees, 5 J. Empirical
Legal Stud. 55 (2008).
124E.g., 2008 Survey at 30–32. The appendix does note that the figures it supplies for assessing statistical significance
are based on comparing “independent” groups. Id. at 32. So the Chamber apparently knows that the appendix does
not supply information sufficient to assess the statistical significance of its results, which do not contain fully
independent groups. In recent years, the appendix also supplies insufficient information to assess the sampling error
of any response for any state. The appendix table labeled “Recommended Allowance for Sampling Error of Propor-
tions” provides information for sample sizes of 400 or greater. Id. at 31. Since the number of respondents for no state
even approaches 400, one cannot use the appendix to assess the sampling error for responses about any state.
125Id. at 28.
126Id. at 39.
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objectively verifiable responses casts doubt on the respondents’ candor or ability to assess
their own knowledge. Given the importance of familiarity with a state, a better practice
would call for the Chamber to report results separately for those claiming that they are
“very” familiar with a state and those claiming that they are “somewhat” familiar with a state.
The Chamber could still aggregate the two categories of respondents if it wished, but the
survey’s consumers and states being ranked are entitled to know the extent to which
rankings stem from respondents less familiar with a state.
D. Failure to Account for Industry
The Chamber’s failure to account for insurance industry oversampling in 2002, noted
above, relates to another problem. Motor vehicle manufacturers, insurance companies,
pharmaceutical companies, and other industries have different characteristics that scholars
usually recognize as requiring accounting for industry in empirical work. Studies of busi-
nesses regularly recognize the importance of accounting for industry effects.127 The
Chamber fails to do so, and that failure has important implications for those the Chamber
wishes to influence with the survey. For example, as noted above, the Chamber reported
that New Jersey plummeted in rank due to “local bias” in drug cases.128 One cannot tell
whether this is due to the disgruntlement of a drug company’s counsel who lost at trial, or
to a more general perception about New Jersey across industries. Policymakers whom the
Chamber seeks to influence deserve to know whether a state’s rank results from a compa-
ny’s counsel being embarrassed by a loss at trial.129
VII. Conclusion
It is surprising how little Chamber respondents know and how unresponsive they are to
changes in their legal environment. This raises a question about the quality of the lawyers
who respond to the survey. The survey methodology may generate a kind of lemon effect.
Poorly informed, inflexible lawyers may be associated with companies’ decisions to press to
trial and trial losses. These weak lawyers are the ones most likely to be upset and to respond
127E.g., Michael G. Hertzel & Janet Kiholm Smith, Industry Effects of Interfirm Lawsuits: Evidence from Pennzoil v.
Texaco, 9 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 425 (1993); Anita M. McGahan & Michael E. Porter, How Much Does Industry Matter,
Really?, 18 Strategic Mgmt. J. 15 (1997) (“industry structure is a central determinant of firm performance, and firm
differences are considered against an industry background”).
128ILR, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/component/ilr_states/18/state/NJ.html, accessed 6/20/2009.
129Bias against drug companies in New Jersey is somewhat implausible. Several large drug companies, including
Merck, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Johnson & Johnson, and Wyeth (acquired by Pfizer), are headquartered in New Jersey.
For summary information about the drug industry’s presence in New Jersey, see http://www.locationnj.com/
NJ_Pharmaceuticals_Profile.asp, accessed 7/28/2009. A large Swiss drug company, Octapharma, moved its U.S.
headquarters from Virginia, a state favored by Chamber respondents, to New Jersey after the Humeston trial. PR
Newswire, Octapharma to Move HQ to Hoboken, NJ, http://www.securityinfowatch.com/ContractWatch/
octapharma-move-hq-hoboken-nj, accessed 7/1/2009.
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to the survey. They provide a biased picture of liability systems that is out of touch with
reality.
The consistently low ranking of many states despite changes in their legal environ-
ments may also suggest a political economy explanation. The Chamber needs devils to
justify its tort reform budget. If it does not label at least some states as in desperate need of
Chamber reform efforts, it might be less able to raise money from members. The Chamber
thus needs liability villains and its survey annually assures that they are perceived to exist.
The survey provides a respectable-looking social science gloss to statistically unsophisticated
policymakers and media outlets.
The Chamber’s willingness to villify states and counties to promote both itself and
legislation may be the product of the same mentality that has led to shocking business
failures. Companies, such as General Motors, with once seemingly impregnable market
positions, spent excess time and effort lobbying for and against laws rather than seeking to
improve their products. “If Detroit had spent less time lobbying for government protection
and more on improving its products it might have fared better.”130 The Chamber may be
leading other members down a similar path. A credible argument exists that the Chamber
harms business by irrationally discouraging investment. Based on the views of risk managers
and those who seriously study the effect of the tort system, the Chamber may also unnec-
essarily endanger the public safety by decreasing tort law’s deterrent effect.
The attention the survey receives illustrates the critical need for better, reliable,
systematic information about the legal system. Absent such information, the informational
vacuum will be filled by questionable special-interest data such as the Chamber’s.131 In this
respect, the survey has had a positive effect. It has prompted at least one state, West Virginia,
to start a data-gathering program to assure accurate information about legal outcomes.132 It
can then assess part of its judicial system’s performance based on actual events. Other states
should follow West Virginia’s data initiative to assure widespread objective knowledge about
how states’ legal systems function.
The information must not only be gathered, but readily available for dissemination.
Surveys on important issues that are as flawed as the Chamber’s usually have muted impact
because the other side to an issue responds with its own surveys. Democrats and Republi-
cans often generate dueling polls and media campaigns on issues of public importance and
likely undermine each others’ most unsupportable claims. But the Chamber attacks an
institution that is not accustomed to defending itself. State judiciaries lack the resources to
respond to the Chamber’s media campaigns and professional norms prevent the judiciaries
from fully responding even if they could. Members of the bar and the social science
community should act to generate and disseminate information needed to present an
objective picture of court performance.
130The Economist, June 6, 2009, at 9.
131Theodore Eisenberg, Use It or Pretenders Will Abuse It: The Importance of Archival Legal Information, 75 UMKC
L. Rev. 1 (2006).
132Thornburg, supra note 7, at 1135.
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